Public Key Establishment

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How to establish public keys?

• point-to-point on a trusted channel
  – mail business card, phone
• direct access to a trusted public file (registry or database)
  – authentication trees
• on-line trusted server (bottleneck)
  – OCSP: Online Certificate Status Protocol
• off-line servers and certificates
  – PKI: Public Key Infrastructure
• implicit guarantee of public parameters
  – identity based and self-certified keys

What is a Certificate?

DN: cn=Planckaert
  o=VTM, c=BE
Serial #: 8391037
Start: 1/3/07 1:00
End: 7/3/08 1:01
CRL: cn=CRL2,
  o=VRS, c=US
Key: CA DN: o=GLS, c=BE

Unique name of owner
Unique serial number
Period of validity
Revocation information
Public key
Name of issuing CA
CA’s digital signature on the certificate

What is a Certificate Revocation List?

DN: cn=CRL2,
  o=VRS, c=US
Start: 1/4/07 1:02
End: 1/5/07 1:02
Revoked: 191231 123832 923756
CRL: cn=CRL2,
  o=VRS, c=US

Unique name of CRL
Period of validity
Serial numbers of revoked certificates
Name of issuing CA
CA’s digital signature on the CRL

PKI Overview

1. Background:
   Keys and Lifecycle Management
2. PKI components (”puzzle pieces”)
3. PKI Architectural View
4. Trust Models

Background:

Keys and
Lifecycle Management
Sending secure e-mail

- Alice composes a message for Bob

Encrypting/Signing...

Alice

Bob

Stored key material

Receiving secure e-mail

Bob uses the one-time symmetric key to retrieve the message text and signed hash

Decrypting/Verifying...

Alice

Bob

Stored keys

Key Lifecycle Management

Key Generation

Certificate Issuance

Certificate Validation

Key Usage

Key Expiry

Key Update

Fundamental PKI features

- Automated and transparent key and certificate lifecycle management
- Consistent behavior across applications

PKI provides Unified Security

Web

E-mail

Desktop

VPN

ERP

PKI

Certification Authority

Timestamping

Cross-Certification

Key Backup & Recovery

Certificate Revocation

Support for non-repudiation

Certificate Repository

Application Software

Automatic Key Update & Histories
**Certification Authority**

- Issue certificates for all entities / devices (for multiple applications) from a single CA
  - single system saves h/w, s/w, training, personnel
- Flexible certificate policy / security policy
  - tailor to needs of environment, application or entity (e.g. certificate lifetime, crypto algorithms, keylengths, password rules, ...)

**Certificate Repository**

- LDAP-compliant directory stores certificates
  - standards-based for interoperability
- Directory products built specifically to address scalability issues
  - X.500 or proprietary schemes to replicate data (scales to millions of users)

**Certificate Revocation**

- Automated CRL publishing
  - when certificate revoked, CRL can be automatically published to directory providing near-immediate availability
  - automated CRL checking by application
  - want to avoid applications which require manual end-user actions to check CRLs for each application or certificate usage
Automated Key Update & History
- Users should never even need to know they have their own certificates (password only)
- If key management is not automated or does not provide key history . . .
  - when certificate expires, lose access to all past encrypted data, e-mail, . . .
  - user must request new certificate and repeat entire registration process
- Should replace key, not just new expiry date
- Transparent triggering mechanism, ideally

Key Backup & Recovery
- Enterprise will lose valuable data if keys used to encrypt data are not backed up
  - 20-40% of users forget passwords / year
  - employees leave the organization
- Allows the enterprise to control the backup
  - not reliant on 3rd parties
  - should be configurable to require multiple administrators to authorize access

Support for Non-Repudiation
- Must use separate key pairs for digital signatures and encryption
  - want backup of encryption keys, do not want backup of signature private keys
- Separate key pairs allows lifecycles to be managed independently
- Different policy controls for each key pair
  - security requirements per pair may differ, e.g. valid lifetimes
Cross-Certification
• Sufficiently flexible to model existing business relationships
  – includes 1-1 relationships and hierarchies
  – cross-certificate associated with an organization (vs. a service provider)
  – compare to web trust model: trust anyone signed by browser-embedded CAs
• Enterprise manages cross-certification policy & procedures, to reduce business risk
  – cross-certificates created by authorized administrators, transparent to end-user

Timestamping
• Legal requirements
• Business requirements related to fixing transactions in time
• Technical requirements related to certificate revocation (non-repudiation)

Application Software
• Designed to be enabled to use the PKI (“PKI-ready”)

PKI
application software
(email, file encryption, VPN, web security/SSL, …)
key & certificate lifecycle mgmt
(certificate validation, key update, …)
crypto algorithms
(symmetric encryption, signature, hash, MAC, key establishment, …)
Summary - Essential PKI Components

- Certification Authority
- Revocation system
- Certificate repository ("directory")
- Key backup and recovery system
- Support for non-repudiation
- Automatic key update
- Management of key histories
- Cross-certification
- PKI-ready application software

More info: IETF PKIX Working Group

- www.ietf.org
- de facto standards for Internet PKI, X.509-based
- Certificate & CRL Profile [PKIX-1]: RFC 2459
- Certificate Mgmt Protocols [PKIX-CMP, PKIX-3]: RFC 2510

PKI vs. Privilege Management

- Public key certificate binds a public key to an entity
- Establishes who owns a key vs. what privileges that key/owner is granted
- Certificate-processing software (relying party) may implicitly grant privileges
- Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) makes privileges explicit
- PMI may utilize PKI as base infrastructure

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Key generation: where?

- CA generates key for user
  - absolute trust
  - need transport of private keys
  - easier management for backup/recovery
- user generates his/her key
  - does user have the expertise? (ok if smart card)
  - need to transport of public keys (integrity channel)
- specialised third party generates keys

Trust Models
Hierarchical trust model

Root CA

Relying parties transfer risk to the Root CA

A
A
A
A
B
B

Enterprise trust model

Subordinate CAs

Relying parties transfer risk to their local CA

A
A
A
A
B
B

Enterprise trust model

Subordinate CAs

The same local CA issues certificates to these parties

A
A
A
A
B
B

Enterprise trust model

Qualified relationships between CAs are established

A
A
A
A
B
B

Enterprise trust model

Hierarchical relationships are a special case

A
A
A
A
B
B
Enterprise trust model

Spoke-and-hub model is another special case

Browser trust model

All relying parties rely on public keys of same set of CAs

Browser trust model

Each of these CAs defines its own community of trust

Browser trust model

A relying party trusts the union of these communities

Personal trust model

( and related: “web-of-trust”)

- all entities are end-users (CAs do not exist)
- keys are essentially self-guaranteed
- some end-users may also be introducers
- end-user imports public keys of others

Characteristics

- suits individuals, not enterprise/corporations
- user-centric
- requires security-aware end-users
- poor scalability

Trust models & Revocation

- public-key systems are commonly engineered with long-life certificates
- certificates bind a key-pair to identity (and potentially privilege information)
- circumstances change over certificate life
  - keys may become compromised
  - identifying information may change
  - privilege may be withdrawn
- need ability to terminate the binding expressed in the certificate
- revocation: most difficult issue in practice
Revocation options

- mechanisms indicating valid certificates
  - short-lifetime certificates
- mechanisms indicating invalid certificates
  - certificate revocation lists - CRLs (v1 X.509)
  - CRL fragments (v2 X.509), including ...  
    - segmented CRLs (CRL distribution points)
    - delta CRLs
    - indirect CRLs
- mechanisms providing a proof of status
  - status-checking protocols (OCSP, ValiCert)
    - iterated hash schemes (Micali)
    - certificate revocation trees

CRL: properties

- basic CRL
  - simplicity
  - high communication cost from directory to user
- improved CRL
  - very flexible
  - more complex
  - reduced communication and storage

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC 2560]

- on-line query to
  - CA
  - or Trusted Responder
  - or CA designated responder
- containing
  - hash of public key CA
  - hash of public key in certificate
  - certificate serial number

OCSP: signed answer

- status
  - good: not revoked
  - revoked
  - unknown
- time
  - thisUpdate
  - nextUpdate
  - producedAt

OCSP: evaluation

- [+] positive and negative information
- [-] need to be on-line
  - risk for denial of service
  - not always possible
- ! OCSP may send you freshly signed but old information

Revocation summary

- established standard meets needs of major application categories
  - v2 CRLs
- continued industry discussion of further options for certificate revocation and validation
  - other standard solutions may emerge
  - vendors will support mainstream alternatives
**Characterizing questions for trust models**

- what are the types/roles of entities involved
- who certifies public keys
- are trust relationships easily created, maintained, updated
- granularity of trust relationships
- ability of particular technology to support existing business models of trust
- how is revocation handled?
- . . . of end-users . . . of certification authorities

**Trust model continuums**

- hierarchical → browser → enterprise → personal
  - [increasing granularity of trust]
- hierarchical → browser → personal → enterprise
  - [increasing capability to represent B2B trust]

Many other continuums can be formulated

**Trust model summary**

Key idea: manageability of trust relationships

Each model has its place --

- personal trust model: okay for security-aware individuals working in small communities
- browser model: simple, large communities, everyone trusts all CAs defined by s/w vendor
- hierarchical model: best given an *obvious* global root and a *grand design* methodology
- enterprise trust model: best between peer organizations, where trust flexibility is required
- global PKI will include variety of trust models